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ABSTRACT
Group signatures present a compromise between the traditional
goals of digital signatures and the need for signer privacy, allowing
for the creation of unforgeable signatures in the name of a group
which reveal nothing about the actual signer’s identity beyond their
group membership. An important consideration that is absent in
prevalent models is that group membership itself may be sensi-
tive information, especially if group membership is dynamic, i.e.
membership status may change over time.
We address this issue by introducing formal notions of mem-
bership privacy for fully dynamic group signature schemes, which
can be easily integrated into the most expressive models of group
signature security to date. We then propose a generic construction
for a fully dynamic group signature scheme with membership pri-
vacy that is based on signatures with flexible public key (SFPK) and
signatures on equivalence classes (SPS-EQ).
Finally, we devise novel techniques for SFPK to construct a highly
efficient standard model scheme (i.e. without random oracles) that
provides shorter signatures than even the non-private state-of-
the-art from standard assumptions. This shows that, although the
strictly stronger security notions we introduce have been com-
pletely unexplored in the study of fully dynamic group signatures
so far, they do not come at an additional cost in practice.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The concept of group signatures was introduced by Chaum and
van Heyst in [24]. It allows a group manager to delegate signing
rights to multiple signers. The group members may create publicly
verifiable signatures on behalf of the entire group, such that the
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signature does not reveal the identity of the actual signer beyond
their membership in the group. A designated opening authority has
the ability to verifiably reveal the actual signer of a particular sig-
nature, in case of abuse. Ideal applications of group signatures are,
for instance, business processes, where responsibility for certain
actions should be shared among the members of one level of man-
agement by creating a signature, but accountability is preserved
via the possibility of after-the-fact opening of a signature through
a supervisory board.
In applications, which enforce public accountability of group
members via the signature mechanism, it is essential that the public
knows who is part of the group. We consider the idea that in some
applications it is equally essential that group membership is not
disclosed and cannot be associated with the user’s global identity
(e.g. represented by a public key), i.e. that the scheme provides
an additional property called: membership privacy. In some cases
leakage of membership information may have negative effects on
the users. In particular, membership in controversial groups may
lead to persecution, e.g. loss of job because of personal interests,
beliefs or affiliation. Membership privacy is also advantageous if
group signatures are used for access control to sensitive resources.
Imagine, e.g., cities that provide free access to charging stations for
electric cars to their inhabitants, but not to non-inhabitants. Group
signatures offer a simple, privacy-preserving solution for access
control in this case, since the charging station only has to verify
that the user is an inhabitant of the city, represented by a group
managed by the city government. However, using a non-private
group signature scheme to implement this incurs a privacy leak,
since cities would have to publish lists of their inhabitants and it
could easily be tracked if and where people are moving between
cities. In more involved scenarios, in the context of delegatable
anonymous credentials [8, 23, 26], a membership private group
signature scheme could be used to enforce confidentiality between
members at different levels of delegation. What is more, since users
can enroll the same public key in several groups—not all of which
necessarily having the same privacy requirements—membership
privacy reduces risk of identity disclosure by avoiding the overhead
of managing a distinct pseudonymous identities for groups where
privacy is required.1
1.1 Formal Models of Group Signatures
The first formal security model, called the static model, was given
by Bellare, Micciancio and Warinschi (BMW) in [10], who also
provided a construction from general assumptions.
1Provided users employ techniques such as anonymity networks to prevent disclosure
on channels other than the group membership information.
Later models, notably the ones due to Bellare, Shi, and Zhang
(BSZ) [11], as well as Kiayias, and Yung (KY) [40, 41], which will
be subsumed under the term (partially) dynamic models, general-
ize the static model in terms of functionality as well as security
considerations:
• The dynamic models split the group manager—previously
entrusted with user key generation and opening—in separate
issuing and opening authorities, allowing stronger security
notions, which consider malicious behaviour on the part of
either.
• The static model requires all potential group members to be
known at setup time, the dynamic models allow dynamic
enrollment after group creation via a join/issue protocol,
where users jointly generate their signing keys in interaction
with the authorities.
In the dynamic models, it has to be ensured that the opening
is performed honestly. Otherwise a malicious opener or a mali-
cious member of the group could produce a dishonest opening that
identifies a wrong signer, either to claim a specific signatures for
themselves, or blame a user for a signature which they did not cre-
ate. Sakai et al. [47] thus define a notion called opening soundness,
which, if achieved, ensures that it is infeasible to create an opening
which points to any but the actual signer of a valid signature.
A further extension of the dynamic models was recently pro-
posed by Bootle et al. [17]. Their model, which we subsequently
call the fully dynamic model, additionally addresses revocation of
group membership, incorporates opening soundness and considers
security even under maliciously generated keys. To model the dy-
namic nature of addition and revocation of members, the scheme’s
lifetime is divided into a series of epochs such that changes in the
group membership require advancing the scheme to the next epoch.
Since the issuing authority decides who may join the group and
who has to leave, the group’s public information is updated by the
issuing authority for each new epoch. The authors show that their
model is general enough to capture previous notions, making it the
most expressive model of the security of group signatures to date.
A related property to our membership privacy was conceived
for the partially dynamic setting by Kiayias and Zhou in Hidden
Identity-Based Signatures [42] and efficiently instantiated by Chow
et al. [25]. In these works, group membership lists are avoided
altogether, enabling to hide the identity of group members even
from the opening authority. We stress that in the fully dynamic
model some form group membership list is necessary to implement
membership revocation, separating these approaches from ours.
RelatedWork. Generic constructions of group signatures from [10]
and [11] established the widely used sign-and-encrypt-and-prove
paradigm (SEP) design paradigm: A signature consists of an encryp-
tion under the opener’s public key of both a members’s signature on
the message and the member’s identity, as well as a non-interactive
zero-knowledge proof that the encrypted identity—typically a sig-
nature issued by the group manager—is valid that of the signer of
the message. Thus, relying on the unforgeability of this signature,
such a group signature scheme achieves non-frameability and trace-
ability. Abdalla and Warinschi proved in [1] that group signatures
are actually equivalent to IND-CPA secure encryption schemes.
In [12], Bichsel et al. identify the SEP design paradigm as a
source of inefficiency in group signatures. They propose a new
approach based on re-randomizable signature schemes and provide
an efficient construction without encryption secure in the random
oracle model. In our paper we follow that idea, however we do not
rely on the random oracle model to prove security of our scheme.
Many group signature schemes were designed for both the static
and dynamic case in the random oracle model which utilize the
RSA cryptosystem [3, 21, 39, 48], discrete logarithm setting [4, 32],
and bilinear setting [13, 22].
One of the first standard model constructions, i.e. without ran-
dom oracles (cf. [45]), was introduced by Ateniese et al. [2] in the
bilinear setting. The scheme is highly efficient, with signature con-
sisting of only 8 group elements. However, it does not provide
full-anonymity in the BMWmodel [10]. In particular, the adversary
is not allowed to see the private keys of honest users.
Boyen and Waters [19, 20] proposed standard model schemes
that use composite order bilinear groups, but in contrast to [2]
allow key exposure attacks, albeit without allowing the adversary
to see any openings of signatures. This restricted version of full-
anonymity is also called CPA-anonymity.
The introduction of the Groth-Sahai (GS) proof system [36] al-
lowed for the design of new and efficient group signature schemes in
the standard model. Groth [35] was the first to introduce a standard
model group signature with constant size public key and signatures,
which preserve the full-anonymity property under a q-type assump-
tion. The GS proof system was also used by Libert et al. [43, 44],
who designed standard model group signatures with revocation
capabilities.
At Crypto’15 Libert, Peters and Yung [45] introduced two effi-
cient group signature schemes that rely on simple assumptions,
the first scheme secure in the static BMW model [10], the second
construction less efficient, but secure in the dynamic security model
from [41].
Bootle et al. [18] propose a generic construction of group signa-
tures from accountable ring signatures. They instantiate it using a
scheme based on a sigma protocol in the random oracle model. Later,
Bootle et al. [17] show that this construction is a fully dynamic
group signature scheme. The idea is to include the description of
the ring as part of the epoch information. This way only users in
the ring are member of the group in the current epoch. Security
follows directly from the security of accountable ring signatures.
Derler and Slamanig proposed a generic construction for dy-
namic group signatures based on structure preserving signatures
on equivalence classes (SPS-EQ) [28]. SPS-EQ define a relation R
that induces a partition on the message space. By signing one repre-
sentative of a partition, the signer in fact signs the whole partition.
Then, without knowledge of the secret key we can transform the
signature to a different representative of the partition. Their group
signatures make use of signatures of knowledge (as part of the
group signature) and non-interactive zero-knowledge proof sys-
tems (in the issuing procedure and to ensure opening soundness).
The authors present an efficient instantiation in the random oracle
model. There currently exists no standard model instantiation.
Recently, Backes et al. [5] introduced a new cryptographic primi-
tive called signatures with flexible public key. The idea is similar to
SPS-EQ , but instead of partitioning the message space, the partition
is on the public key space. In other words, signers can randomize
their public key and secret key to a different representative of the
same equivalence class and create a signature that is valid under
the new public key. The authors also show how to combine their
primitive with SPS-EQ to construct static group signatures, which
are secure in the BMW model [10].
Group signatures can also be constructed from lattice-based as-
sumptions [46] or symmetric primitives [14]. The former is the
only scheme secure under lattice-based assumptions for which the
signature size does not depend on the number of group members.
Unfortunately, it is only secure in the partially dynamic model [11]
and in the random oracle model. The latter scheme is also instanti-
ated in the random oracle model.
1.2 Our Contribution in Detail
In this paper we revisit the fully-dynamic group signature frame-
work by Bootle et al. [17]. We observe that the epoch information
published with each modification of the group (joining or leaving
of a member) may leak the identities of members. For instance in
the scheme proposed in [18], where the epoch information con-
tains a list of active members, this information is required to verify
a signature. This is a major issue that limits the applications of
group signatures and introduces real-world privacy risks that are
not captured by the security model. In particular, let us consider the
use of group signatures as part of a corporate/governmental access
control system to resources. In such a scenario group signatures
protect access patterns between mutually rival departments. On
the other hand, leaking a list of active members of the group can be
used potential adversaries to perform targetted attacks, e.g. bribery
attempts, phishing attacks on private emails or denial of service
attacks. An application that was impossible using previous defini-
tions are private groups that can be used to create an electronic
authentication method for private club members. Members of the
club are unknown to the public and other members of the club but
the group signatures allows a way to prove membership if required.
Therefore, as our first contribution, we propose a new security
notion for fully dynamic group signatures, namely membership
privacy. Informally, when a group signature scheme offers mem-
bership privacy it means that an external observer cannot tell who
joined or left the group in a given epoch, even if a subset of the
group’s members is controlled by the observer.2 The possibility of
membership privacy changes the meaning of a group signature to
the external public compared to the previous models. The public
may still verify that the signature was created by a party which
received signing capabilities from the issuing authority, but not
only is there no indication who the signer was specifically, but
even the group of potential signers is hidden. As a consequence,
to an external observer, the group signature scheme is a way for
the issuing authority to dynamically delegate signing capabilities
to anonymous signers, who can be held privately accountable by
the opening authority. In extending the model of Bootle et al. [17]
we give formal definitions of join and leave privacy, which taken
2A similar property was recently put forward by Baldimtsi et al. [7] for the security
of cryptographic accumulators, which are one of the building block of revocation
systems for anonymous credentials. Although based on similar real-world concerns,
their definition is specific to cryptographic accumulators and cannot be easily applied
to group signatures.
together constitute membership privacy in the most expressive
model of group signature security to date.
Our second contribution is a generic construction of fully-dynamic
group signatures with membership privacy. Our scheme is built
upon novel techniques in the area of signatures with flexible pub-
lic keys (SFPK) and their fruitful combination with signatures on
equivalence classes (SPS-EQ). The former primitive allows signing
keys to be re-randomized within a system of equivalence classes,
while the second allows the same for messages and signatures. We
build upon the idea, introduced in [5], of using the combination of
SFPK and SPS-EQ schemes with compatible systems of equivalence
classes to construct highly efficient privacy-preserving signature
schemes. Each epoch the group manager uses a fresh instance of
SPS-EQ to certify the public signing keys of members, which live
in SFPK equivalence classes. However, instead of certifying the
original keys in the epoch information, the group manager ran-
domizes the public signing key and encrypts the randomization
using the signer’s public encryption key. Members can decrypt the
randomization and use the SPS-EQ signature from the epoch infor-
mation. Additionally, the signer creates a proof of knowledge of a
unique representative of the equivalence class and the randomness
used by the signer. This unique representative can be extracted
by the tracing authority and used to identify the signer because
the unique representative is also used as the signer’s global public
key. Membership privacy is ensured because the group manager
randomizes the published public key list.
Lastly we show how to optimize our generic construction and
efficiently instantiate it under standard assumptions without rely-
ing on the random oracle model. The resulting scheme has shorter
signatures than state-of-the-art schemes [36, 45] that are secure in
the same setting but only allow for partially-dynamic groups. To
achieve this efficiency we introduce a new SFPK scheme that has
an optimal public key size of 2 group elements in G1. The scheme is
secure under the bilinear decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption and
the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption inG1. The technique that
makes our instantiation of group signatures possible is a notion
called canonical representative. Informally, we define a unique rep-
resentative for every equivalence class, which allows us to identify
the class without the use of any additional trapdoor. In the previous
definition by Backes et al. [5] the only way to identify a class was
by using a trapdoor created during key generation, which hinders
all applications where keys have to be secret but identifying classes
has to be done publicly. We summarize our results as follows:
(1) We extend the definitions of Bootle et al. [17] and show
that membership privacy can be seamlessly integrated in the
previous security models for fully dynamic group signatures.
(2) We devise a generic construction of fully dynamic group
signatures with membership privacy that can be instantiated
in the standard model.
(3) We devise a novel technique for the conjunction of SFPK
and SPS-EQ , allowing us to build a highly efficient standard
model group signature schemes along the lines of our generic
construction, but with shorter signature size than even state-
of-the-art non-private schemes with comparable assumption.
This underlines that membership privacy need not come at
additional cost.
2 PRELIMINARIES
Notation. We denote byy ←$ A(x) the execution of algorithmA
on input x and with output y. By r ←$ S we mean that r is chosen
uniformly at random over the set S . We will use 1G to denote the
identity element in group G, [n] to denote the set {1, . . . ,n}, and ®u
to denote a vector. Finally, by AO we denote an algorithm A that
has access to oracle O. When the number of oracles is large we will
also write A{O1, ...,...,On } to denote access to oracles O1, . . . ,On .
We write ExpϕA,Ψ(1λ) ⇒ 1 for the event that the experiment Exp
returns 1, when instantiated with parameters ϕ, adversary A and
primitive Ψ, all of which possibly omitted. We define the adjusted
advantage of adversary A in this experiment as
Adv [x] ExpϕA,Ψ (1λ) :=
Pr [ExpϕA,Ψ(1λ) ⇒ 1 ] − x 
If x = 0, we write instead AdvExp
ϕ
A,Ψ (1λ) for its advantage.
2.1 Signatures on Equivalence Classes
We now recall the notion of signatures on equivalence classes
(SPS-EQ) introduced by Hanser and Slamanig [37]. The signing
algorithm SPS.Sign(skSPS, ®M) defines an equivalence relation R
that induces a partition on the message space. A signer can sim-
ply sign one representative of the class to create a signature for
the whole class. The signature can then be changed without the
knowledge of the secret key to a different representative using the
SPS.ChgRep(pkSPS,M,σSPS, r ) algorithm. Existing instantiations
work in the bilinear group setting and allow to sign messages from
the space G∗ℓi , for ℓ > 1. The partition on the message space in
those schemes is induced by the relation Rexp : given two messages
®M, ®M ′ ∈ G∗ℓi , we say thatM andM ′ are from the same equivalence
class (denoted by [ ®M]R ) if there exists a scalar r ∈ Z∗p , such that for
all i ∈ [ℓ] it holds Mri = M ′i . In terms of security, Hanser and Sla-
manig [37] define notions of unforgeability under chosen-message
attacks and class-hiding. Fuchsbauer and Gay [31] introduce a re-
laxed notion, unforgeability under chosen-open-message attacks,
which restricts the adversaries’ signing queries to messages of
which it knows all exponents.
Definition 2.1 (EUF-{CMA, CoMA}). For SPS-EQ scheme SPS =
(BGGen,KGen, Sign,ChgRep,Verify,VKey) on G∗ℓi we define the
following experiments, parameterized in the given signing oracle:
EUF−tℓA,SPS
BG← SPS.BGGen(λ);
(skSPS, pkSPS) ←$ SPS.KGen(BG, ℓ);
( ®M∗, σ ∗SPS) ←$ AOt (skSPS, ·)(pkSPS)
return ∀M ∈ Q . [ ®M∗]R , [ ®M ]R ∧
SPS.Verify(pkSPS, ®M∗, σ ∗SPS) = 1
OCMA(skSPS, ®M ∈ G∗ℓi )
σSPS ← SPS.Sign(skSPS, ®M )
Q := Q ∪ ®M
return σSPS
OCoMA(skSPS, ®e ∈ Z∗ℓp )
®M := (дe1, . . . , дeℓ )
σSPS ← SPS.Sign(skSPS, ®M )
Q := Q ∪ ®M
return σSPS
A SPS-EQ is existentially unforgeable under chosen-message
attacks / chosen-open-message attacks, if for all PPT algorithmsA,
their advantageAdvEUF−t ℓA,SPS (1λ) is negligiblewhere t ∈ {CMA,CoMA}.
Fuchsbauer and Gay also propose a strengthened class hiding no-
tion, called perfect adaptation of signatures. Informally, this notion
states that signatures received by changing the representative of
the class and new signatures for the representative are identically
distributed.
Definition 2.2 (Perfect Adaption of Signatures). A SPS-EQ scheme
on G∗ℓi perfectly adapts signatures if for all (skSPS, pkSPS, ®M,σ , r ),
where ®M ∈ G∗ℓ1 , r ∈ Z∗p ,
SPS.VKey(skSPS, pkSPS) = 1, and SPS.Verify(pkSPS, ®M,σ ) = 1,
the two distributions
( ®Mr , SPS.Sign(skSPS, ®Mr )) and SPS.ChgRep(pkSPS, ®M,σ , r )
are identical.
2.2 Signatures with Flexible Public Key
In our group signature construction we use a primitive called signa-
tures with flexible public keys (SFPK), that was recently introduced
by Backes et al. [5] and which we extend by the notion of canonical
representatives (or canonical form).
In SFPK the public key space is partitioned into equivalence
classes induced by a relation R. A signer can efficiently gener-
ate (sk, pk) ←$ SFPK.KGen(1λ) and change her key pair to a dif-
ferent representative of the same class via two algorithms pk′ ←$
SFPK.ChgPK(pk, r ) for the public key and sk′ ←$ SFPK.ChgSK(sk, r )
for the secret key, which take the same randomness r ←$ coin.
The randomized secret key can be used to sign a message Sig ←$
SFPK.Sign(sk′,m), such that the signature can be verified by run-
ning SFPK.Verify(pk′,m, Sig). Class-hiding ensures that, without
a trapdoor, it is hard to distinguish if two public keys are related,
i.e. in the same equivalence class. If a key pair has been gener-
ated along a trapdoor δ using (sk, pk,δ ) ←$ SFPK.TKGen(1λ), then
given the trapdoor one can run 0/1 ← SFPK.ChkRep(δ , pk′) to
check if pk′ is in relation to pk. The original definition by Backes
et al. uses a strong corruption model, where the adversary is given
the random coins used to generate the challenged keys. We will
show that in our construction a slightly weaker model, where the
adversary gets only the secret keys, is sufficient. We will define
this scheme in the multi-user setting, i.e. with a setup algorithm
SFPK.CRSGen(1λ) that outputs a common reference string ρ. We
only consider a scenario in which this setup has to be executed
by a trusted party in order for the scheme to be unforgeable. Note
that this means that the secrets used to generate the CRS can be
used to forge signatures. This kind of trapdoor δρ was not specified
in [5], but we will use it in the security proof of our group signature
scheme. In other words, this means there is an alternative signing
algorithm SFPK.Sign(δρ , pk,m), which outputs valid signatures for
the relation class [pk]R , without knowledge of the corresponding
secret key sk.
Definition 2.3 (Signature with Flexible Public Keys). A signature
scheme with flexible public keys SFPK is a set of PPT algorithms
such that:
SFPK.CRSGen(1λ): on input a security parameter 1λ , outputs
a trapdoor δρ and a common reference string ρ, which is an
implicit input for all the algorithms.
SFPK.KGen(1λ ,ω): on input a security parameter 1λ and ran-
dom coins ω ∈ coin, outputs a pair (sk, pk) of secret and
public keys.
SFPK.TKGen(1λ ,ω): on input a security parameter 1λ and ran-
dom coins ω ∈ coin, outputs a pair (sk, pk) of secret and
public keys, and a trapdoor δ .
SFPK.Sign(sk,m): on input a messagem ∈ {0, 1}∗ and a sign-
ing key sk, outputs a signature Sig.
SFPK.ChkRep(δ , pk′): on input a trapdoor δ for some equiva-
lence class [pk]R and public key pk′, outputs 1 if pk′ ∈ [pk]R
and 0 otherwise.
SFPK.ChgPK(pk, r ): on input a representative pk of equiva-
lence class [pk]R and random coins r , outputs a different
representative pk′, where pk′ ∈ [pk]R .
SFPK.ChgSK(sk, r ): on input a secret key sk and random coins
r , outputs an updated secret key sk′.
SFPK.Verify(pk,m, Sig): on input a messagem, signature Sig
and public verification key pk, outputs 1 if the signature is
valid and 0 otherwise.
To simplify notationwewrite (sk′, pk′) ← SFPK.ChgKeys(sk, pk,
r ) as shorthand for the joint randomization of secret and public
keys using the same r .
Definition 2.4 (Correctness). We say that a SFPK scheme is cor-
rect if for all 1λ ∈ N, all random coins ω, r ∈ coin the following
conditions hold:
(1) The key pairs output by SFPK.KGen and SFPK.TKGen are
identically distributed.
(2) For all key pairs (sk, pk) ←$ SFPK.KGen(1λ ,ω) and all mes-
sages m we have SFPK.Verify(pk,m, SFPK.Sign(sk,m)) =
1 and SFPK.Verify(pk′,m, SFPK.Sign(sk′,m)) = 1, where
(sk′, pk′) ← SFPK.ChgKeys(sk, pk, r ).
(3) For all (sk, pk,δ ) ←$ SFPK.TKGen(1λ ,ω) and all pk′ we have
SFPK.ChkRep(δ , pk′) = 1 if and only if pk′ ∈ [pk]R .
Definition 2.5 (Class-hiding with Key Corruption). For scheme
SFPK with relation R and adversary A we define the following
experiment:
C-HRA,SFPK(λ)
ω0, ω1 ←$ coin
(ski , pki ) ←$ SFPK.KGen(1λ, ωi ) for i ∈ {0, 1}
b ←$ {0, 1}; r ←$ coin
(sk′, pk′) ← SFPK.ChgKeys(skb, pkb, r )
bˆ ←$ ASFPK.Sign(sk′, ·)((sk0, pk0), (sk1, pk1), pk′)
return b = bˆ
A SFPK is class-hiding with key corruption if for all PPT adver-
saries A, their adjusted advantage Adv [ 12 ] C-HA,SFPK(1λ) is negligi-
ble.
Definition 2.6 (Strong Existential Unforgeability under Flexible
Public Key). For scheme SFPK with relation R and adversary A
we define the following experiment:
sEUF − CMARA,SFPK(λ)
ω ←$ coin
(sk, pk, δ ) ←$ SFPK.TKGen(1λ, ω);Q := ∅
(pk′,m∗, Sig∗) ←$ AO1(sk, ·),O2(sk, ·, ·)(pk, δ )
return (m∗, Sig∗) < Q ∧
SFPK.ChkRep(δ, pk′) = 1 ∧
SFPK.Verify(pk′,m∗, Sig∗) = 1
O1(sk,m)
Sig←$ SFPK.Sign(sk,m)
Q := Q ∪ {(m, Sig) }
return Sig
O2(sk,m, r )
sk′ ←$ SFPK.ChgSK(sk, r )
Sig←$ SFPK.Sign(sk′,m)
Q := Q ∪ {(m, Sig) }
return Sig
A SFPK is existentially unforgeable with flexible public key under
chosen message attacks if for all PPT adversariesA, their advantage
AdvsEUF−CMARA,SFPK (1λ) is negligible.
Canonical Representatives. It might be the case that every public
key equivalence class has a unique representative which can act as
a description of the class. We will call such objects the canonical
representatives of the given classes and further assume that if a
scheme has canonical representatives, there is an efficient predicate
IsCanonical which on input a public key will return 1 if and only if
the public key is canonical. We will use this type of public key and
representative later in the optimized variant of our scheme.
Definition 2.7 (SPS-EQ/SFPKCompatibility). An SPS-EQ scheme
and an SFPK scheme are compatible if the message space of the
former is the same as the key space of the latter and they share the
same equivalence relation.
2.3 Additional Preliminaries
In the following sections, we make use of a number of well-known
cryptographic primitives, including programmable hash functions,
digital signature schemes, key-private public key encryption, as
well as efficient non-interactive proof systems. The instantiations
of our constructions are in the bilinear setting, i.e. in the presence
of a bilinear group generation algorithm BG and we prove secu-
rity under the standard decisional Diffie-Hellman and and bilinear
decisional Diffie-Hellman assumptions, relative to BG respectively.
Definition 2.8 (Bilinear map). Let us consider cyclic groups G1,
G2, GT of prime order p. Let д1,д2 be generators of respectively G1
and G2. We call e : G1 × G2 → GT a bilinear map (pairing) if it is
efficiently computable and the following holds:
Bilinearity: ∀(S,T ) ∈ G1 × G2, ∀a,b ∈ Zp , we have
e(Sa ,Tb ) = e(S,T )a ·b ,
Non-degeneracy: e(д1,д2) , 1 is a generator of group GT ,
Depending on the choice of groups we say that map e is of type
1 if G1 = G2, of type 2 if G1 , G2 and there exists an efficiently
computable isomorphism ψ : G2 → G1, of type 3 if no such iso-
morphismψ is known.
Definition 2.9 (Bilinear-group generator). A bilinear-group gen-
erator is a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm BGGen that
on input a security parameter 1λ returns a bilinear group BG =
(p,G1,G2,GT , e,д1,д2) such that G1 = ⟨д1⟩, G2 = ⟨д2⟩ and GT are
groups of order p and e : G1 × G2 → GT is a bilinear map.
2.4 Assumptions
Definition 2.10 (Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption in Gi ).
Given BG and elements (дai ,дbi ,дzi )∈ G3i it is hard for all PPT ad-
versariesA to decide whether z = a ·b mod p or z ←$ Z∗p . We will
use AdvddhA (λ) to denote the advantage of the adversary in solving
this problem.
If the instance were given in both groups, i.e. (дa1 ,дb1 ,дz1 ,дa2 ,
дb2 ,д
z
2 ) then the pairing would allow to efficiently check e(дa1 ,дb2 ) =
e(дz1 ,д2). An analogous problem, which is assumed difficult even
in the presence of a pairing is given by adding values дc1 ,д
c
2 to the
challenge and asking whether z = a ·b ·c mod p. This was noted by
Boneh and Franklin [15] who defined a similar problem called Weil
decisional Diffie-Hellman problem in the type 1 setting. In their
later work [16] it was renamed to bilinear decisional Diffie-Hellman
assumption. We restate it for type 3 pairings as follows:
Definition 2.11 (Bilinear Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption).
Given BG and elements (дa1 ,дb1 ,дc1 ,дz1 ,дa2 ,дb2 ,дc2 ,дz2 ) ∈ G41 × G42 it
is hard for all PPT adversaries A to decide whether z = a · b · c
mod p or z ←$ Z∗p . We will use AdvbddhA (λ) to denote the advantage
of the adversary in solving this problem.
Definition 2.12 (Collision-Resistance). We call a hash function H :
{0, 1}∗ → Z∗p collision-resistant if it is hard for all PPT adversaries
A to output two distinct messagem1,m2 for whichH(m1) = H(m2)
We will use AdvcollA (λ) to denote the advantage of the adversary in
finding a collision for this hash function.
2.5 Programmable Hash Functions
We now recall the definition of programmable hash functions in-
troduced by Hofheinz and Kiltz [38]. We first define a group hash
function for groupG and output length ℓ = ℓ(λ) as consisting of two
polynomial time algorithms PHF.Gen and PHF.Eval. For a security
parameter λ, the generation algorithm KPHF ←$ PHF.Gen(1λ) out-
puts a key. This key can be used to deterministically evaluate the
hash function via y ∈ G← PHF.Eval(KPHF,X ), where X ∈ {0, 1}ℓ .
Definition 2.13. A group hash function (PHF.Gen,PHF.Eval) is
an (m,n,γ ,δ )-programmable hash function if there are polynomial
time algorithms PHF.TrapGen and PHF.TrapEval such that:
• For any д,h ∈ G the (K ′PHF, td) ←$ PHF.TrapGen(1λ ,д,h)
outputs a key K ′ and trapdoor td . Then, for every X ∈
{0, 1}ℓ we have (aX ,bX ) ←$ PHF.TrapEval(td,X ), such that
PHF.Eval(K ′PHF,X ) = дaX hbX .
• For all д,h ∈ G and for (K ′PHF, td) ←$ PHF.TrapGen(1λ ,д,h)
and KPHF ←$ PHF.Gen(1λ), the keys KPHF and K ′PHF are
statistically γ -close.
• For all д,h ∈ G and all possible keys K ′PHF from the range
of PHF.TrapGen(1λ ,д,h), for all X1, . . . ,Xm ,Z1, . . . ,Zn ∈
{0, 1}ℓ such that Xi , Z j for any i, j and for the correspond-
ing (aXi ,bXi ) ←$ PHF.TrapEval(td,Xi ) and (aZi ,bZi ) ←$
PHF.TrapEval(td,Zi ) we have
Pr[aX1 = · · · = aXm = 0 ∧ aZ1 = · · · = aZn , 0] ≥ δ ,
where the probability is over the trapdoor td that was pro-
duced along with key K ′PHF.
Hofheinz and Kiltz show that the function introduced by Wa-
ters [49] is a programmable hash function. For a key KPHF =
(h0, . . . ,hℓ) ∈ Gℓ+1 and message X = (x1, . . . ,xℓ) ∈ {0, 1}ℓ the
function is computed as h0 ·∏ℓi=1 hxii . In particular, they prove that
for any fixed q = q(λ) it is a (1,q, 0, 1/8 · (ℓ + 1) · q)-programmable
hash function.
2.6 Non-Interactive Proof Systems
LetR be an efficiently computable binary relation, where for (x ,w) ∈
R we call x a statement and w a witness. Moreover, we will de-
note by LR the language consisting of statements in R, i.e. LR =
{x | ∃w : (x ,w) ∈ R}.
Definition 2.14 (Non-Interactive Proof System). A non-interactive
proof system Π consists of the following three algorithms:
Setup(1λ): on input security parameter 1λ , outputs a common
reference string ρ.
Prove(ρ,x ,w): on input common reference string ρ, statement
x and witnessw , outputs a proof π .
Verify(ρ,x ,π ): on input common reference string ρ, statement
x and proof π , outputs either accept(1) or reject(0).
Some proof systems do not need a common reference string. In
such a case, we omit the first argument to Π.Prove and Π.Verify.
Definition 2.15 (Soundness). A proof system Π is called sound,
if for all PPT algorithms A the following probability, denoted by
AdvsoundΠ,A (λ), is negligible in the security parameter 1λ :
Pr[ρ ←$ Setup(1λ); (x ,π ) ←$ A(ρ) : Verify(ρ,x ,π ) = accept∧x < LR ].
where the probability is taken over the randomness used byΠ.Setup
and the adversaryA. We say that the proof system is perfectly sound
if AdvsoundΠ,A (λ) = 0.
Definition 2.16 (Witness Indistinguishability (WI)). A proof sys-
tem Π is witness indistinguishable, if for all PPT algorithms A we
have that the advantage AdvwiΠ,A (λ) computed as:
| Pr[ρ←$ Setup(1λ );(x,w0,w1)←$ A(1λ,ρ);
π←$ Prove(ρ,x,w0) : A(π ) = 1]−
Pr[ρ←$ Setup(1λ );(x,w0,w1)←$ A(1λ,ρ);
π←$ Prove(ρ,x,w1) : A(π ) = 1]|,
where (x ,w0), (x ,w1) ∈ R, is at most negligible in λ. We say that the
proof system if perfectly witness indistinguishable if AdvwiΠ,A (λ) =
0.
Definition 2.17 (Zero-Knowledge). A proof systemΠ is called zero-
knowledge, if there exists a PPT simulator S = (SimGen, Sim) such
that for all PPT algorithmsA the following probability, denoted by
AdvzkΠ,A (λ), is negligible in the security parameter 1λ :
|Pr[ρ ←$ Setup(1λ) : AProve(ρ, ·, ·)(ρ) = 1]−
Pr[(ρ,τ ) ←$ SimGen(1λ) : AS (ρ,τ , ·, ·)(ρ) = 1]|,
where τ is a trapdoor information, oracle call S(ρ,τ ,x ,w) returns
the output of Sim(ρ,τ , x) for (x ,w) ∈ R and both oracles output ⊥
if (x ,w) < R.
Definition 2.18 (Simulation Sound Extractability). A proof system
Π is called simulation sound, if there exists a knowledge extractor
E = (ExtGen, Extract) and simulator S = Sim, such that for all
algorithms A
AdvsseΠ,A (λ) =
Pr
[ (ρ,τ ,ψ )←$ ExtGen(1λ );
(x,π )←$ ASim(ρ,τ , ·)(ρ,ψ );
w←$ Extract(ρ,ψ ,x,π )
: (x,π )<Q ∧ (x,w )<R∧ Verify(ρ,x,π )=1
]
is negligible in λ, where Q is a list of simulation queries and re-
sponses (xi ,πi ) of Sim and (ρ,τ ) is identical to the output of SimGen
from the definition of zero-knowledge.
2.7 Digital Signatures and Public Key
Encryption
In our group signature construction we also make use of stan-
dard digital signatures and public key encryption schemes. We use
(DS.KGen,DS.Sign,DS.Verify) to denote the algorithms that make
up the scheme DS and Adveuf−cmaA,DS (λ) to denote the adversaries’
advantage against existential unforgeability under chosen message
attacks of the signature scheme.
A public key encryption scheme PKE consists of three algorithms
(PKE.KeyGen,PKE.Enc,PKE.Dec). We use the standard notion of
indistinguishability of ciphertexts under chosen message attacks
(IND − CPA) as well as the notion of key privacy under chosen
message attacks (IK − CPA), which informally requires that it is
infeasible for an attacker to determine which key was used to create
a given ciphertext even if with access to both encryption keys. A full
formal definition of this property can be found in [9]. An example
of a scheme which achieves key privacy is the El Gamal encryption
scheme [33]. Finally, we will use⇌ to denote the relation between
the secret key and the corresponding public key. Note that for many
schemes, like e.g. El Gamal, this relation can be easily checked and
proven.
3 FULLY DYNAMIC GROUP SIGNATURES
We recall the framework of definitions for fully dynamic group
signatures established in [17].
Definition 3.1. A fully dynamic group signature (FDGS) scheme
GS is defined by the following set of efficient algorithms
GS.Setup(1λ): On input a security parameter, the setup algo-
rithm outputs public parameters param and initializes the
user registration table ®reд.
⟨GS.KGenM (param),GS.KGenT (param)⟩: Given the public pa-
rameters param the group managerM and tracing manager
T jointly execute a key generation protocol.
• The private output of the group manager is a secret man-
ager keymsk, its public output a manager public keympk
and the initial group information info.
• The private output of the tracing manager is a secret trac-
ing key tsk and a tracing manager public key tpk.
The public outputs together are referred to as the group
public key gpk := (param,mpk, tpk).
GS.KGenU (param): On input the public parameters, the user
key generation algorithm outputs a pair of user secret and
user public key
( ®usk[uid], ®upk[uid]) , bound to a fresh user
id uid.
⟨GS.Join(infoτ , gpk, uid, ®usk[uid]),
GS.Issue(infoτ ,msk, uid, ®upk[uid])⟩: A user who has
executed GS.KGenU , obtaining a user id uid and key pair( ®usk[uid], ®upk[uid]) may, given the group public key and
information regarding the current epoch infoτ engage the
group manager in a join-issue procedure to become a mem-
ber of the group. If successful, the output of the GS.Issue
algorithm is user registration information which is stored
in ®reд[uid]; the user group signing key ®дsk[uid] is updated
with the output of GS.Join.
GS.RevokeMember(gpk,msk, infoτcurrent ,S, ®reд): The group
manager may advance the current epoch τcurrent to the
next epoch τnew , at the same time revoking membership of
a subset S of the set of active group members. If any uid ∈ S
is not assigned to an active member of the group, i.e. was not
assigned in a run of the join-issue procedure, the algorithm
aborts. The output is the new group information infoτnew
and a possibly updated registration table ®reд. If the group
information does not change, the algorithm outputs ⊥.
GS.Sig(gpk, ®дsk[uid], infoτ ,m): Given their group signing key,
current group information and the group public key, a user
may sign a message, producing a signature Σ. If uid is not
assigned to an active group member in the current epoch
τcurrent , the algorithm outputs ⊥ instead.
GS.Vf(gpk, infoτ ,m, Σ): If the given signature Σ is valid for
messagem in epoch τ output accept, otherwise reject.
GS.Trace(gpk, tsk, infoτ , ®reд,m, Σ): Given a signature, message,
group information for epoch τ and a registration table, the
tracing manager may output a pair (uid,π ) where uid > 0
identifies the user-ID of the group member who produced
the signature and π is a proof of this fact. If tracing is not
successful the algorithm will output a pair (0,π ) indicating
the failure via the special user-ID 0, which is not assigned to
any regular user.
GS.Judge(gpk, uid, infoτ ,πTrace, ®upk[uid],m, Σ): Given a sig-
nature for epoch τ , the corresponding group information
and a tracing output (uid,π ), anyone in possession of the
group public key can deterministically judge the validity of π
w.r.t. to the statement, that Σ was created using ®дsk[uid], in
which case the algorithm outputs accept, otherwise reject.
3.1 Security Definitions
We recall from [17] the correctness and security definitions for
FDGS (cf. Figure 1).
Correctness. Amalicious usermay not undermine the correctness
of the scheme. This includes unforgeability of the scheme.
Definition 3.2. A FDGS scheme GS is correct if for all PPT adver-
saries A, their advantage AdvCorrectnessA,GS (1λ) is negligible.
Anonymity. Given a signature, it is infeasible, without a secret
trapdoor information, to distinguish which signer created it.
Definition 3.3. A FDGS scheme GS achieves anonymity if for all
PPT adversariesA, their adjusted advantageAdv [ 12 ] AnonymitybA,GS (1λ)
over the additional uniform choice of b ∈ {0, 1} is negligible.
CorrectnessA,GS(1λ)
param←$ GS.Setup(1λ );H := ∅
(msk, mpk, info, tsk, tpk) ←$ ⟨GS.KGenM (param), GS.KGenT (param)⟩
gpk := (param, mpk, tpk)
(uid,m, τ ) ←$ AAddU,ReadReg,Revoke(gpk, info)
if uid < H or ®дsk [uid] = ⊥ or infoτ = ⊥
or GS.IsActive(infoτ , ®r eд, uid) = 0
then return 0
Σ←$ GS.Sig(gpk, ®дsk[uid], infoτ ,m)
if GS.Vf(gpk, infoτ ,m, Σ) = reject
then return 1
(uid∗, π ) ←$ GS.Trace(gpk, tsk, infoτ , ®r eд,m, Σ)
if uid , uid∗ then return 1
if GS.Judge(gpk, uid, infoτ , π , ®upk [uid ],m, Σ) = 0
then return 0 else return 1
TraceabilityA,GS(1λ)
param←$ GS.Setup(1λ );H, C, B, Q := ∅
(st, tsk, tpk) ←$ A⟨GS.KGenM(param), ·⟩ (init : param)
if ⊥ ← GS.KGenM (param) or A’s output invalid
then return 0
(msk, mpk, info) ← GS.KGenM (param); gpk := (param, mpk, tpk)
(m, Σ, τ ) ←$ A
{AddU, CrptU,
SndToM, RevealU,
Sign, ModifyReg,
Revoke
}
(play :, st, gpk, info)
if GS.Vf(gpk, infoτ ,m, Σ) = reject
then return 0
(uid, π ) ←$ GS.Trace(gpk, tsk, infoτ , ®r eд,m, Σ)
if GS.IsActive(infoτ , ®r eд, uid) = 0 or uid = 0
or GS.Judge(gpk, uid, infoτ , π , ®upk [uid],m, Σ) = 0
then return 1 else return 0
Non − FrameA,GS(1λ)
param←$ GS.Setup(1λ );H, C, B, Q := ∅
(st, info, msk, mpk, tsk, tpk) ←$ A(init : param)
if msk = ⊥ or mpk = ⊥
then return 0
gpk := (param, mpk, tpk)
(m, Σ, uid, π , infoτ ) ←$ A
{CrptU, Sign,
SndToU,RevealU,
ModifyReg
}
(play : st, gpk)
if GS.Vf(gpk, infoτ ,m, Σ) = 0
or GS.Judge(gpk, uid, infoτ , π , ®upk [uid],m, Σ) = 0
then return 0
if uid ∈ H \ B and (uid,m, Σ, τ ) < Q
then return 1 else return 0
AnonymitybA,GS(1λ)
param←$ GS.Setup(1λ );H, C, B, Q, Q∗ := ∅
(st, msk, mpk, info) ←$ A⟨·,GS.KGenT (param)⟩ (init : param)
if ⊥ ← GS.KGenT (param) or A’s output invalid
then return 0
(tsk, tpk) ← GS.KGenT (param); gpk := (param, mpk, tpk)
d ←$ A
{AddU, CrptU,
SndToU, RevealU,
Trace, ModifyReg,
Challb
}
(play : st, gpk)
return d == b
Figure 1: Security experiments for fully dynamic group signatures, excluding Tracing Soundness.
Traceability. No coalition of group members and the opening
authority can produce a signature which opens to an invalid identity
or an identity that was not active in the signing epoch.
Definition 3.4. A FDGS scheme GS achieves traceability if for all
PPT adversariesA, their advantage AdvTraceabilityA,GS (1λ) is negligible.
Non-Frameability. No coalition of malicious group members and
the issuing and opening authorities can produce a signature which
opens to an honest user identity.
Definition 3.5. A FDGS scheme GS achieves non-frameability
if for all PPT adversaries A, their advantage AdvNon−FrameA,GS (1λ) is
negligible.
Functional Tracing Soundness. A further property defined in [17]
is tracing or opening soundness: Even if all parties in the group
collude, they cannot produce a valid signature that traces to two
different members.
A subtle point arises in the definition of tracing soundness,
namely how is the uniqueness of group members established? If the
adversary controls several users, they may share the same public
key, hence their signatures cannot be distinguished by an open-
ing which reveals the public key of the signer. Because of this, the
opening instead leads to a specific user identity, i.e. an entry in the
public registration table. This has two-fold consequences: 1) The
user registration table has to be public, otherwise the opening is
meaningless. 2) To verify an opening or a signature, it has to be
verified as well that the group at the time of the creation of the
signature was well-formed, i.e. every member occupies exactly one
slot in the registration table.
We propose a relaxation of this notion, which allows us to avoid
these implications. Our notion, functional tracing soundness distin-
guishes members by their public keys, i.e. it should not be possible,
even in a fully corrupted group to create a valid signature and two
openings for it which indicate conflicting public keys. The modifi-
cations to the tracing soundness experiment which implement this
change are highlighted .
We observe that the FDGS scheme based on accountable ring
signatures presented in [17] adheres to this definition already, since
its proof of tracing soundness relies on the tracing soundness of the
underlying accountable ring signature scheme. The property for
accountable ring signature schemes requires that the verification
keys provided in the two openings be different.
Note that the construction of FDGS presented later in this work
can be made to achieve the original version of tracing soundness,
albeit at the cost of the above mentioned group integrity checks
and any kind of group membership privacy.
Definition 3.6 (Functional Tracing Soundness). For a FDGS scheme
GS we define the following experiment:
Functional − Trace − SoundA,GS(1λ)
param←$ GS.Setup(1λ ); C := ∅
(st, info, msk, mpk, tsk, tpk) ←$ A(init : param)
if msk = ⊥ or mpk = ⊥
then return 0
gpk := (param, mpk, tpk)
(m, Σ, {uidi , πi }2i=1 , infoτ ) ←$ ACrptU,ModifyReg(play : st, gpk)
if GS.Vf(gpk, infoτ ,m, Σ) = 0
then return 0
if ®upk [uid1] = ®upk [uid2] or ∃i ∈ {1, 2 } s.t. ®upk [uidi ] = ⊥
or GS.Judge(gpk, uidi , infoτ , πi , ®upk [uidi ],m, Σ) = 0
then return 0 else return 1
A FDGS scheme GS achieves functional tracing soundness if for all
PPT adversaries A, their advantage
AdvFunctional−Trace−SoundA,GS (1λ)
is negligible.
3.1.1 Experiment State and Oracle Intuition. The experiments may
be stateful and keep lists of the attackers’ actions to subsequently
determine whether the attacker was successful or not. These lists
are the following:
H : Honest users added via AddU.
C: Users with maliciously generated keys, added via CrptU.
B: Users whose secret keys were revealed to the adversary via
RevealU.
Q: Signature Queries, populated by Sign.
Q∗: Signatures created by the challenge users, populated by
Chall.
The formal description of the given oracles can be found in
the full version of this paper. Informally, they serve the following
functions:
AddU(uid): If uid is new to the system, run GS.KGenU (1λ) to
honestly generate the user’s keys ( ®usk[uid], ®upk[uid]) and
add uid toH . Afterwards the honest key generation is run
using GS.Join and GS.Issue. This determines the user group
secret key ®дsk[uid] and the contents of the registration table
®reд[uid]. Return new epoch information infoτ and the user’s
public key ®upk[uid].
CrptU(uid, pk): If uid is new to the system, set ®upk[uid] to
the supplied key pk and add uid to C. Initiates a join/issue
session for uid.
SndToM(uid,Min): Advance a currently running join/issue ses-
sion for corrupted user uid by running the group manager
side of the session with adversary provided input Min. If
the session concludes successfully, the challenger updates
®reд[uid] with the final group manager session state. Return
the group manager responseMout.
SndToU(uid,Min): Advance or initiate a join/issue session for
user uid by running the user side of the session with the
adversary provided inputMin. If the session concludes suc-
cessfully, the challenger updates ®дsk[uid] := stuidGS.Join ac-
cordingly with the final user session state. Return the user
responseMout.
ReadReg(uid): Return registration table entry ®reд[uid].
ModifyReg(uid, val): Set entry ®reд[uid] := val.
RevealU(uid): Return the user secret keys ( ®usk[uid], ®дsk[uid])
add uid to the set of bad users B.
Sign(uid,m,τ ): If τ is a valid epoch, where uid is active, cre-
ate a signature Σ←$ GS.Sig(gpk, ®дsk[uid], infoτ ,m) and add
(uid,m, Σ,τ ) to the set of queried signatures Q. Return Σ.
Trace(m, Σ, infoτ ): If Σ is valid in epoch τ and is not part of the
challenge set Q∗, return GS.Trace(gpk, tsk, infoτ , ®reд,m, Σ).
Revoke(S): ReturnGS.RevokeMember(gpk,msk, infoτ ,S, ®reд).
Challb (infoτ , uid0, uid1,m): If uid0 and uid1 are both active
and honest in τ , run GS.Sig(gpk, ®дsk[uidb ], infoτ ,m) to ob-
tain signature Σ, adding (m, Σ,τ ) to the challenge signature
set Q∗ and returning the signature.
In addition, the challenger keeps track of the active members of
the group. We assume it has access to an algorithm GS.IsActive as
follows.
GS.IsActive(infoτ , ®reд, uid) : Given a group information for epoch
τ , a registration table ®reд and a user-ID uid, outputs 1 if uid
is a non-revoked member of the group in that epoch, 0 oth-
erwise.
3.2 Leave-Join Privacy for FDGS
Formal models of dynamic group signatures thus far implicitly
assumed that the public is aware who is a member of the group.
Usually, a registration table is published, such that the entries are
bound to public keys of the members. This is in line with one of the
main application of group signatures: authenticating messages with
the authority of a known group, certifying that an indeterminate
someone within the group has seen the signed message and taken
responsibility on behalf of the group.
In their seminal work Chaum and van Heyst [24], however, did
not specify this as an essential requirement. In fact, they point
out that group signatures can be used for access control, where
knowingmembers of the group is an obvious privacy leak that could
for instance lead to targeted DoS attacks on the group. Therefore
it seems natural that in some applications we want to hide the
identities of active group members.
To address this issue we discuss for the first time membership
privacy for fully dynamic group signatures. Informally, we will
say that a group signature scheme has membership privacy if it
protects the identity of users that join or leave the system. This
means that we consider a scenario in which some kind of public
identifier about users is known independently of the scheme (e.g.
public key) but it is unknown to a third party who is part of the
group. Moreover, we assume that some users can be corrupted or
can collude to infer information about the membership status of
other users.
To formally define this notion, we propose a pair of security ex-
periments which are expressed in the fully dynamic framework put
forth by [17]. However, one can easily specify similar experiments
Join − PrivacyA,GS(1λ)
param←$ GS.Setup(1λ )
(msk, mpk, info, tsk, tpk) ←$ ⟨GS.KGenM (param), GS.KGenT (param)⟩
gpk := (param, mpk, tpk)
(st, uid0, uid1) ←$ A0
{
AddU,RevealU,CrptU,SndToM,
Sign,Trace,Revoke
}
(gpk, info)
if {uid0, uid1 } ∩ C , ∅ then return 0
b ←$ {0, 1}; (info∗, ®upk [uidb ]) ←$ AddU(uidb );
( ®usk [uid1−b ], ®upk [uid1−b ]) ←$ GS.KGenU (1λ )
τ ∗ := τcurrent ; H∗ := {uid0, uid1 }
d ←$ A1
{
AddU,RevealU,CrptU,SndToM,
Sign,Trace,Revoke
}
(st, info∗, ®upk [uid0], ®upk [uid1])
return b = d
Leave − PrivacyA,GS(1λ)
param←$ GS.Setup(1λ )
(msk, mpk, info, tsk, tpk) ←$ ⟨GS.KGenM (param), GS.KGenT (param)⟩
gpk := (param, mpk, tpk)
(st, uid0, uid1) ←$ A0
{
AddU,RevealU,
Revoke,Sign,Trace
}
(gpk, info)
if {uid0, uid1 } ∩ H \ (C ∪ B) , {uid0, uid1 } then return 0
b ←$ {0, 1};H∗ := {uid0, uid1 }; decinv := true ; τ ∗ := τcurrent
info∗ ←$ GS.RevokeMember(gpk, msk, infoτ ∗ , {uidb }, ®r eд)
d ←$ A1
{
AddU,RevealU,
Revoke,Sign,Trace
}
(st, info∗)
return b = d
Figure 2: Security experiments for Join- and Leave-Privacy.
for the partially dynamic models [11, 40, 41]. The first one describes
join privacy, since it considers the case that two non-members are
known in one epoch and in the next epoch one of them joins the
system and the task is to distinguish who joined the group. The
second experiment describes leave privacy and models the case that
there are two known members in one epoch and in the next epoch
one of them leaves the group. Note that this assumes that the adver-
sary knows out of band that the two users had previously joined the
group.3 In both cases we allow an adversary to corrupt members
of the group but we consider both authorities to be honest: The
issuing authority always knows who is part of the group and the
tracing authority can open all signatures to extract the identities of
members. In particular, this implies that the registration table ®reд
may not be public because one could easily infer current members
from it. Fortunately, this seems a fairly natural assumption. This
registration table is not necessary in any of the user-run algorithms
and it is easier to keep it local to the authorities than publishing it
online. An exception is the scheme [47] mentioned above, where
the registration table is part of the verification algorithm to ensure
that tracing soundness holds with respect to public user identities
rather than in the functional sense we describe.
We formally define join and leave privacy in terms of the two
experiments shown in Figure 2. Note, that we introduce a new set
of privacy challenge usersH∗. In the two experiments,H∗ is used
to restrict the function of oracles which would allow trivial success
for the adversary:
• The privacy challenge users may not be removed from the
group, i.e. Revoke returns ⊥ if S ∩H∗ , ∅. This is because
GS.RevokeMember is defined to return ⊥ if the group infor-
mation does not change as result of the revocation, which
would be the case if the user was already removed from the
group.
• The privacy challenge users may not be corrupted or have
their keys revealed. Note, that this also prevents an adversary
from re-enrolling a challenge user by initiating a join-issue
session for them.
3Note that two users cannot join in the same epoch by the definition ofAddU. Schemes,
where batch additions in the same epoch are possible may, however, still achieve
membership hiding.
• The signing oracle treats signature requests for user IDs
in the privacy challenge set differently. In the case of join
privacy, a signature request for any privacy challenge user,
i.e. uid0 or uid1 will be treated like a signature request for
user uidb who joined the system. In the case of leave privacy,
it will be treated like a signature request for user uid(1−b)
who did not leave the group. Additionally, the queries will be
added to the set of challenge queries Q∗, which prevents the
adversary from using the Trace oracle to produce an opening
for them.
Definition 3.7. A FDGS scheme GS has join privacy if for all PPT
adversaries A, their adjusted advantage
Adv
[
1
2
]
Join−Privacy
A,GS (1λ)
is negligible.
Definition 3.8. A FDGS scheme GS has leave privacy if for all
PPT adversaries A, their adjusted advantage
Adv
[
1
2
]
Leave−Privacy
A,GS (1λ)
is negligible.
Remark 1. Note that leave privacy as stated above only seems to
ensure privacy, when a single user leaves the group, however, the
GS.RevokeMember algorithm allows simultaneous membership re-
vocation for a whole set of usersS. However, a simple hybrid argument
should suffice to extend the property from one revocation to many
revocations.
4 OUR CONSTRUCTION
In this section we formalize the group signature proposed in the
introduction. We present the full algorithms in Figure 3. The idea
of our construction is as follows. The issuer uses signatures on
equivalence classes to certify group members’ SFPK public keys4.
As already noted by Backes et al. [5] this forms self-blindable cer-
tificates, i.e. each member can randomize the certificate and their
4The definition by Hanser and Slamanig uses bilinear groups BG but this primitive is
not limited to the bilinear setting and BG can be seen as parameters.
public key which is computationally indistinguishable from the
original public key used during the issuing procedure. To add and
revoke members, each epoch the issuer generates a new SPS-EQ
keypair and puts the public key in the epoch information. To pre-
vent malicious epoch information, the issuer signs the SPS-EQ
public key using a standard digital signature scheme. To protect
the identities of members, the issuer does not directly publish the
new certificates but uses a randomization, i.e. certificates for public
keys that are in relation to keys of members. To allow the members
to restore the right certificate, the issuer encrypts the random coins
that can be used to restore the original certificate. The encryption is
done under the members encryption key.What is more, key-privacy
ensures that the ciphertexts do not leak the identities. Note, that
the join/issue session in our construction is non-interactive in the
sense that the group manager can add members to the group given
only their user public key, hence the GS.Join algorithm is trivial.
Statement xSign:
∃ (pkSFPK, r ) s. t.
SFPK.ChgPK(pkSFPK, r ) = pk′SFPK
∧ IsCanonical(pkSFPK)
∨ cSFPK = PKE.Enc(pkSFPK, tpk)
To enable tracing we use the
canonical representative of
SFPK, i.e. a signer encrypts
their canonical representative
under the tracing authority
public key and uses proof
system ΠGS.Trace to prove in
statement xSign that the ran-
domized SFPK public key is in
relation to this encrypted key.
The complete group signature is composed of a randomized
SPS-EQ certificate from the issuer on the randomized SFPK public
key of the member, a ciphertext of the canonical representative,
a proof that this ciphertext is sound and a SFPK signature on all
those values and the message.
Statement xTrace:
∃ (tsk) s. t.
( ®upk [uid]) ←$ PKE.Dec(tsk, cSFPK)
∧ tsk⇌ tpk
Finally, the proof system
ΠGS.Judge is used by the
tracing authority to prove
in statement xTrace that the
decrypted public key corre-
sponds to public keys used
during the issuing procedure.
Theorem 1 (Join Privacy). Our construction has private joins if
the encryption scheme used by the signers is IND − CPA secure and
has IK − CPA key privacy and the SFPK scheme is adaptively class
hiding with key corruption.
Proof. We consider a series of games. In the following let uidb
be the challenge userwho is inserted into the group and let gpk[uidb ] =
(pkSFPK, pkEnc) be their public key and ®дsk[uidb ] = (skSFPK, skEnc)
be their secret key. Let Si denote the event that the adversary wins
in GAMEi .
GAME0 Is the original join privacy game, so Pr[S0] = Advjoin−privacyGS,A (λ).
GAME1 We modify how the challenge group information is cre-
ated. For this we generate a fresh public key encryption key pair
(sk, pk) ←$ PKE.KeyGen(1λ). After the challenge user uidb is added
using AddU, we replace his entry (c = PKE.Enc(pkb ,k),σSPS) in
the epoch information with (PKE.Enc(pk,k),σSPS), i.e. we replace
the encryption key of the randomness to a fresh key. It is easy to
see that, since the encryption scheme has key privacy we have
Pr[S1] ≤ Pr[S0] + Advik−cpaPKE,A (λ).
GAME2 In this game we further modify the ciphertext in the chal-
lenge user’s part of info∗ by encrypting the value 0 instead of
the randomness used to change the SFPK key signed in σSPS. Be-
cause the encryption scheme is IND − CPA secure it holds that
Pr[S2] ≤ Pr[S1] + Advind−cpaPKE,A (λ).
GAME3 Instead of changing the representative of user uidb ’s SFPK
public key, we generate a fresh public key and change its represen-
tative. The signature in info∗ will now be on this fresh represen-
atative. We will also use this fresh key to sign in the queries made
to PrivChall. We observe that Pr[S3] ≤ Pr[S2]+Advc-hSFPK,A (λ). Fur-
ther, we have Pr[S3] = 12 , since the updated epoch information
and the signatures received from the challenge signing oracle are
completely independent of the challenge users.
Putting it all together we thus have
Advjoin−privacyGS,A (λ) ≤ Adv
ik−cpa
PKE,A (λ)+Adv
ind−cpa
A (λ)+Advc-hSFPK,A (λ).
□
Theorem 2 (Leave Privacy). Our construction has leave privacy
if the encryption scheme used by the signers is IND − CPA secure and
has IK − CPA key privacy and the SFPK scheme is adaptively class
hiding with key corruption.
Proof. This proof follows similar steps as the proof for join
privacy. We consider a series of games, where in the first game b
is fixed to 0 and in the last game, b is fixed to 1. Let Si denote the
event that A’s final output in GAMEi is 0.
GAME0 The Leave − Privacy game, where bit b is fixed to 0.
GAME1 We change the public key used to encrypt the epoch data
for user uid0 using the public key of user uid1. We have |Pr[S0] −
Pr[S1]| ≤ Advik−cpaA,PKE(λ).
GAME2 We now change the randomness encrypted in this cipher-
text to the randomness for user uid1. Because of IND − CPA security
of the encryption schemewe have |Pr[S1]−Pr[S2]| ≤ Advind−cpaA,PKE (λ).
GAME3 We change the SFPK public key to the public key of uid1,
also changing the signatures in PrivChall to this secret key. The
game is now the same as the Leave − Privacy gamewith the bit fixed
to 1. Because of adaptive class hiding we have |Pr[S2] − Pr[S3]| ≤
Advc-hA,SFPK(λ).
□
Theorem 3 (Anonymity). Our construction is anonymous if the
SPS-EQ signature scheme perfectly adapts signatures, the SFPK scheme
is adaptively class-hiding with key corruption and strongly existential
unforgeable, the proof system used by signers is witness-indistinguishable
and the proof system used by the tracing authority is zero-knowledge.
GS.Setup(1λ)
(ρSFPK, ·) ←$ SFPK.CRSGen(1λ )
BG←$ SPS.BGGen(1λ )
ρJ ←$ ΠGS.Judge .Setup(1λ )
ρT ←$ ΠGS.Trace .Setup(1λ ); τ := 0
return param := (1λ, BG, ρSFPK, ρJ, ρT )
GS.Issue(infoτcurrent ,msk, uid, ®upk[uid])
msk = (skDS, skSPS), ®upk [uid] = (pkSFPK, pkEnc)
infoτcurrent [uid] = (pkSPS, σDS, Active)
abort if ¬IsCanonical(pkSFPK)
k ←$ coin; c ←$ PKE.Enc(pkEnc, k );
σSPS ←$ SPS.Sign(SFPK.ChgPK(pkSFPK, k ), skSPS)
Active′ := Active ∪ {(c, σSPS)}
infoτcurrent [uid] := (pkSPS, σDS, Active′)
®r eд[uid] := ®upk [uid]
GS.RevokeMember(gpk,msk, infoτcurrent ,S, ®reд)
msk = (skDS, skSPS)
(sk′SPS, pk′SPS) ←$ SPS.KGen(BG, 2)
msk := (skDS, sk′SPS)
infoτcurrent = (·, ·, Active); A := {i | user i is active}
foreach i ∈ A \ S
®r eд[uid] = (pkiSFPK, pkiEnc)
k ←$ coin; c ←$ Enc(pkiEnc, k );
σSPS ←$ SPS.Sign(SFPK.ChgPK(pkiSFPK, k ), skSPS)
Active′ := Active′ ∪ (c, σSPS)
return infoτnew = (pk′SPS, DS.Sign(skDS, pk′SPS), Active′)
GS.KGenM (param)
(skDS, pkDS) ←$ DS.KGen(1λ )
(skSPS, pkSPS) ←$ SPS.KGen(BG, ℓ)
info := (pkSPS, DS.Sign(skDS, pkSPS), ∅)
return (msk := (skDS, skSPS),
mpk := pkDS, info)
GS.KGenT (param)
(tsk, tpk) ←$ PKE.KeyGen(1λ )
return (tsk, tpk)
GS.KGenU (1λ)
(skSFPK, pkSFPK) ←$ SFPK.KGen(1λ )
(skEnc, pkEnc) ←$ PKE.KeyGen(1λ )
return ( ®usk [uid] := (skSFPK, skEnc),
®upk [uid] := (pkSFPK, pkEnc))
GS.Sig(gpk, ®дsk[uid], infoτ ,m)
infoτcurrent = (pkSPS, ·, Active)
®дsk [uid] = (skSFPK, skEnc); gpk[uid] = (pkSFPK, pkEnc)
abort if ¬∃ (c, σSPS) ∈ Active s. t.
k ← PKE.Dec(c, skEnc) and
SPS.Verify(SFPK.ChgPK(pkSFPK, k ), σSPS, pkSPS) = 1
r ←$ coin; (sk′SFPK, pk′SFPK) ← SFPK.ChgKeys(skSFPK, pkSFPK, r )
σ ′SPS ←$ SPS.ChgRep(pkSFPK, σSPS, r · k−1, pkSPS)
cSFPK ←$ PKE.Enc(pkSFPK, tpk)
ΠSFPK ←$ ΠGS.Trace .Prove(ρT, xSign, w = (pkSFPK, r ))
SigSFPK ←$ SFPK.Sign(sk′SFPK,m | |τcurrent | |pk′SFPK | |σ ′SPS | |ΠSFPK | |cSFPK)
return Σ := (pk′SFPK, σ ′SPS, ΠSFPK, cSFPK, SigSFPK)
GS.Vf(gpk, infoτ ,m, Σ)
infoτ = (pkSPS, σDS, ·); mpk = pkDS
Σ = (pkSFPK, σSPS, ΠSFPK, cSFPK, SigSFPK)
/ xSign is the same statement as in GS.Sig
reject if DS.Verify(pkDS, pkSPS, σDS) = reject or
ΠPPE .Verify(ρΠ, xSign, ΠSFPK) = reject or
SPS.Verify(pkSPS, pkSFPK, σSPS) = reject
M :=m | |τ | |pkSFPK | |σSPS | |ΠSFPK | |cSFPK
return SFPK.Verify(pkSFPK, M, SigSFPK)
GS.Trace(gpk, tsk, infoτ , ®reд,m, Σ)
Σ = (pkSFPK, σSPS, ΠSFPK, cSFPKSigSFPK)
(pkSFPK) ←$ PKE.Dec(tsk, cSFPK)
abort if ¬∃uid s. t. ®r eд[uid] = (pkSFPK, ·)
π ←$ ΠGS.Judge .Prove(ρJ, xTrace, w = (tsk))
return (uid, π )
GS.Judge(gpk, uid, infoτ ,πTrace, ®upk[uid],m, Σ)
rejectif GS.Vf(gpk, infoτ ,m, Σ) = reject
Σ = (·, ·, ΠSFPK, cSFPK ·); ®upk [uid] = (pkSFPK, ·)
/ Statement xTrace as in GS.Trace
return ΠGS.Judge .Verify(ρJ, xTrace, π )
Figure 3: Our generic construction of fully dynamic group signatures.
Proof. We will use the game base approach. Let us denote by
Si the event that the adversary wins the anonymity experiment
in GAMEi . Moreover, let n be the number of queries to the AddU
oracle made by the adversary and let (info∗τ , uid∗1, uid∗2,m∗) be the
query made to the Challb oracle, which outputs
Σ∗ = (pk∗SFPK,σ ∗SPS,Π∗SFPK, c∗SFPK, Sig∗SFPK).
GAME1: We simulate the proof generated in GS.Trace by the trac-
ing authority.
Obviously, we only lower the advantage of the adversary by a
negligible fraction because of the zero-knowledge property of this
proof. Thus, we have |Pr[S1] − Pr[S0]| ≤ AdvzkA,ΠGS.Judge (λ).
GAME2: We change the way the Trace oracle works. Instead of us-
ing tsk to decrypt pkSFPK from cSFPK, we first extract the witness
(pkSFPK, r ) and use pkSFPK instead. What is more, we simulate the
proof Π∗SFPK, which is part of the challenges signature.
Note that since the proof system ΠGS.Trace is simulation-sound
extractable it follows that |Pr[S2] − Pr[S1]| ≤ AdvsseA,ΠGS.Trace (λ).
GAME3: We change the way the ciphertext c∗SFPK is computed. In-
stead of encrypting the canonical representative, we encrypt the
value 0.
Note that because of the changes made in the previous game,
the Trace oracle works as in GAME2. Thus, we have that |Pr[S3] −
Pr[S2]| ≤ Advind−cpaPKE,A (λ)
GAME4: We now change the way we compute σ ∗SPS . Instead of
using the SPS.ChgRep algorithm to change representation of an
old signature, we compute the SPS-EQ signature directly on pk∗SFPK.
Since the SPS-EQ signature scheme perfectly adapts signatures,
we have Pr[S4] = Pr[S3]
GAME5: Given the experiments bit b, we choose index i ←$ [n] and
abort if uidb does not correspond to the user created in the i-th
query of the adversary to AddU.
We have Pr[S4] = n · Pr[S5].
GAME6: Let pkSFPK be the SFPK public key of the user chosen in the
previous game. We now instead of using pkSFPK to create pk∗SFPK,
we use a fresh key generated using KGenSFPK.
We will now show that any adversary A that can distinguish
those games, can be used to brake the weak class-hiding of the
SFPK scheme. We will show how to build a reduction R that does
this. Let (sk0SFPK, pk0SFPK), (sk1SFPK, pk1SFPK) and pk′SFPK be the in-
puts given to R by the challenger in the adaptive class-hiding
experiment. The reduction then sets pk0SFPK as the i-th honest user
SFPK public key. All other key material for those users is con-
structed as described in the scheme. Now in order to answer the
query (info∗τ , uid∗1, uid∗2,m∗) to theChallb oracle, the reduction: sets
pk∗SFPK = pk
′
SFPK, computes σ
∗
SPS as inGAME3, computes Π
∗
SFPK as
in GAME2, computes c∗SFPK ←$ PKE.Enc(pk′SFPK, tpk), asks its sign-
ing oracle for Sig∗SFPK undermessagem
∗ | |τ ∗ | |pk∗SFPK | |σ ∗SPS | |Π∗SFPK | |
c∗SFPK, and returns Σ
∗ = (pk∗SFPK,σ ∗SPS,Π∗SFPK, c∗SFPK, Sig∗SFPK). Note
that since it knows sk0SFPK and sk
1
SFPK it can easily answer all cor-
ruption queries made by A. In the end A outputs a bit b, which
is also returned by R. It follow that we have |Pr[S6] − Pr[S5]| ≤
Advc-hA,SFPK(λ).
We now argue that the only way the adversary A can break
anonymity is by creating a randomization
Σ′ = (pk′SFPK,σ ′SPS,Π′SFPK, c ′SFPK, Sig′SFPK)
of the signature Σ∗ = (pk∗SFPK,σ ∗SPS,Π∗SFPK, c∗SFPK, Sig∗SFPK) and use
Σ′ in a query to the Trace oracle. Since in GAME5 we changed
the public key pk∗SFPK to a random one, this is the only part of the
simulation, where the adversary can notice something. Thus, for
this to work the adversary must use a valid signature Sig′SFPK for
pk′SFPK ∈ [pk∗SFPK]R . We distinguish two cases: Sig′SFPK = Sig∗SFPK
and Sig′SFPK , Sig
∗
SFPK. If Sig
′
SFPK = Sig
∗
SFPK this means that
pk′SFPK = pk
∗
SFPK and either σ
′
SPS , σ
∗
SPS or Π
′
SFPK , Π
∗
SFPK. Since
pk∗SFPK is set to random public key in GAME6 we can use an ad-
versary that creates such a signature Σ′ to break strong existential
unforgeability of the SFPK scheme. In case Sig′SFPK , Sig
∗
SFPK, we
notice that in order for the adversary to see that this is a simulation
the public key pk′SFPK must be in relation to pk
∗
SFPK. Thus, we can
again use the adversary to break the strong existential unforgeabil-
ity of the SFPK scheme, even if σ ′SPS = σ
∗
SPS, Π
′
SFPK = Π
∗
SFPK and
pk′SFPK = pk
∗
SFPK.
In other words, the only way the adversary can randomize the
challenged signature is by randomizing the SFPK signature because
the other values are signed. However, since the scheme is strongly
unforgeable the adversary has negligible chances to do so. It follows
that Pr[S6] = Advseuf−cmaA,SFPK (λ). In the end we have:
Pr[S0] ≤n ·
(
Advc-hA,SFPK(λ) + Advseuf−cmaA,SFPK (λ)
)
+ Advind−cpaPKE,A (λ) + AdvsseA,ΠGS.Trace (λ) + AdvzkA,ΠGS.Judge (λ).
□
Theorem 4 (Traceability). Our construction is traceable if the
SPS-EQ scheme is existential unforgeable under chosen-message at-
tacks, the SFPK scheme is existential unforgeable and the signature
scheme used by the Issuer is existential unforgeable under chosen-
message attacks.
Theorem 5 (Non-frameability). Our construction is non-frameable
if the SFPK scheme is existential unforgeable and the proof system
used by the tracing authority is sound.
Theorem 6 (Functional Tracing Soundness). Our construc-
tion has functional tracing soundness if the underlying SFPK scheme
has canonical representatives, the proof system used by the Judge is
sound and the proof system used by the signers is a proof of knowledge.
The full proofs for theorems 4, 5 and 6 can be found in [6].
5 DISCUSSION AND EFFICIENT
INSTANTIATION
The generic construction presented above can be easily instanti-
ated in the standard model, without random oracles, using known
schemes. In particular, we can use the standard model signatures
on equivalence classes by Fuchsbauer and Gay [31] and one of the
compatible SFPK signature schemes by Backes et al. [5]. For the
encryption scheme one can use El Gamal encryption and standard
model digital signatures. Finally, both proof systems can be instan-
tiated using the simulation-sound system by Groth [34]. However,
due to the simulation-sound proof system and the large public keys
of the SFPK schemes, the signature size is not competitive with
existing schemes. We will now show how to minimize the signature
size, while still using only building blocks that are secure under stan-
dard assumptions and without random oracles. The objective is to
instantiate our construction in a way that it has shorter signatures
than the current state-of-the-art scheme by Libert-Peters-Yung [45]
presented at Crypto’15, which is only secure in a weaker model.
Optimization. To decrease the signature size we have to solve
the following problems:
(1) The proof system ΠGS.Trace must allow the security reduc-
tion for the anonymity experiment to simulate the challenged
proof and at the same time extract witnesses to properly sim-
ulate the Trace oracle,
Scheme Signature size
⋆
[bits]
Group public⋆
key size Membership Assumptions
Libert-Peters-Yung [45] 8 448 O(λ) static standard
Boyen-Waters [20]‡ 6 656 O(λ) static q-type
Boneh-Boyen-Shacham [13] 2 304 2048-bit static q-type
Bichsel et al. [12] 1 280 1024-bit partially dynamic† interactive
Groth [35] 13 056 O(1) partially dynamic q-type
Libert-Peters-Yung [45] 14 848 O(λ) partially dynamic standard
Bootle et al. [17] O(logN ) O(1) fully dynamic♣ standard
Our generic construction O(1) O(λ) fully dynamic + membership hiding♣ standard
. . . instantiated with Scheme 5 13 056 O(λ) fully dynamic + membership hiding♣ standard
⋆ At a 256-bit (resp. 512-bit) representation of Zq , G1 (resp. G2) for Type 3 pairings and at a 3072-bit factoring and DL modulus with 256-bit key
♣ The size of the epoch information isO (N )
† The scheme defines additionally a join↔issue procedure
‡ Adapted from type 1 to type 3 pairings as in [45]
Figure 4: Comparison of Group Signature Schemes for N Active Members
(2) The public key of the SFPK signature must be short and
allow for a simple proof of canonical representation,
(3) If possible, simplification of the statement proven inΠGS.Trace.
First, we replace the simulation-sound system with a simple
NIWI proof system. In fact, we instantiate all building blocks such
that we can use the popular Groth-Sahai proofs for pairing product
equations. To do so, we introduce a trapdoor witness that can be
used by the reduction to simulate the proof, while still being able
to extract the witness. Of course, we have to prevent the adversary
from using this trapdoor to create valid proofs. We achieve this by
introducing a new element K2 = дk2 as part of the groups public key
that will be part of the statement. The trapdoor witness are then
two valuesw1 andw2, such that e(w1,K2) = e(w2,д2). It is easy to
see that any adversary that is able to compute such a witness can
be used to break the DDH assumption in G2.
To solve the second problem we propose an SFPK scheme that
works analogously to the schemes presented in [5], but allows us
to use canonical representatives by moving to our weaker class-
hiding definition. The scheme uses public keys in G1 × G1 with
the established projective equivalence relation, i.e. pk ∈ [pk′]R if
there is a µ ∈ Z∗p such that pkµ1 = pk′1 and pk
µ
2 = pk
′
2. For such
classes of public keys, we define the canonical representative as
the public key for which the first element is just д1. We give a full
SFPK scheme based on this approach and secure under the bilinear
Diffie-Hellman assumption in Section 6.
To simplify the statement proven in ΠGS.Trace, we get rid of the
ciphertext cSFPK, that is used by the tracing authority to identify
signers. To preserve this functionality, we allow the tracing au-
thority to generate the parameters for the proof system ΠGS.Trace,
including an extraction trapdoor which allows to extract the used
witness and compute the corresponding canonical representative.
When applying all the above techniques the statement proven
by the signer will have the form:
∃ (pkSFPK, r ,w1,w2) s. t.
SFPK.ChgPK(pkSFPK, r ) = pk′SFPK ∧ IsCanonical(pkSFPK)
∨ e(w1,K2) = e(w2,д2).
The construction and proofs can be found in the full paper [6].
Efficiency of the Instantiation. The signature itself is composed of
an SFPK public key pk′SFPK, an SFPK signature SigSFPK, an SPS-EQ
signature σ ′SPS and proof ΠSFPK. To instantiate SFPK signatures we
use Scheme 5, which means that pk′SFPK is 2 elements in G1 and
SigSFPK is 2 elements in G1, 1 in G2 and 1 in Z∗p . Similar to the
static group signature in [5], we will instantiate the SPS-EQ with
the scheme from [31]. This means that the SPS-EQ signature takes
10 elements in G1 and 4 elements in G2.
Taking into account that we will use Scheme 5, the above state-
ment can instantiated as follows. Let pk′SFPK = (pk′1, pk′2) and
pkSFPK = (pk1, pk2), we can then express this proof by the pair-
ing product equations: e(w1,K2) = e(w2,д2) and e(pk′1,дr
−1
2 ) =
e(д1,д2) · e(w1,д2). It is easy to see that the witness (r ,w1,w2) =
(0, (д1)−1, (K1)−1) is a trapdoor witness that can be used in the se-
curity proof to create a valid proof for an arbitrary pk′SFPK. The
canonical representative pkSFPK is only used by the tracing author-
ity to open signatures. However, by extracting the witness R = дr−12
it can still do this because if pk′2 = дx ·r1 , then e(pk′2,R) = e(дx1 ,д2)
is a static value that is common for all public keys in relation with
pk′SFPK. Since the tracing authority has access to the registration
table that contains public keys in canonical form of active members
it can correctly open signatures.
Instantiating those equations using the fine-tuned Groth-Sahai
proofs presented in [30] (assuming decisional Diffie-Hellman), the
proof size is 10 elements in G1 and 8 elements in G2. This is con-
stituted by: 2 group elements in G2 for the first equation, which is
linear; 4 elements in G1 and G2 for the second equation; 6 elements
inG1 for the three witnesses inG1; 2 elements inG2 for the witness
r . Overall the group signature is composed of 28 elements in G1,
15 in G2 and 1 in Z∗p .
The digital signature scheme DS and the public key encryption
scheme PKE are standard components, an example of a key private
PKE scheme is ElGamal encryption. The proof systemΠGS.Judge can
also be instantiated using Groth-Sahai proofs for pairing product
equations [30]. Note that this means that the tracing authority has
to prove correct decryption of a ciphertext (witnesses are encoded in
form of El Gamal encryptions) and that its public key was generated
using a DDH tuple, which can easily be expressed as pairing product
equations.
We provide a comparison with existing group signature schemes
in Figure 4. We omit lattice-based schemes in our comparison,
because the only constant-size scheme was proposed by Ling et
al. [46] and as argued by the authors the size is impractical.
Comparison with Previous Constructions. Some of the techniques
used in our construction are similar to the static group signatures
by Backes et al. [5] and the dynamic group signatures presented by
Derler and Slamanig [29]. In particular, we use signatures on equiv-
alence classes as a certificate of membership. The latter uses signa-
tures of knowledge to allow for traceability and to have an actual
signature. Thus, their scheme can only be efficiently instantiated
in the random oracle model, since standard model instantiations
of proofs of knowledge of an exponent are logarithmic in the size
of the exponent. The construction of Backes et al. uses SFPK sig-
natures and standard proof systems like ours. In their scheme, the
tracing authority uses the SFPK trapdoor to distinguish public key
equivalence classes. Since their scheme is static, the issuer/tracing
authority can obtain this trapdoor during user key generation. In
the dynamic setting, where we want to achieve non-frameability,
the members generate their keys themselves in an interactive pro-
tocol with the issuer, preventing this approach. We address this by
introducing the canonical representative into the notion of SFPK
signature. We then allow the tracing authority to check the ran-
domized public key, given as part of the group signature, against
the canonical representative used during the joining procedure.
Group Update and Signing Complexity. We will first focus on
the computational complexity of the group manager in regards to
adding/removing members. To add a new member the manager
creates a SPS-EQ signature under the member’s public key that
acts as a kind of certificate. Furthermore it encrypts the random
coins used to blind the member’s public key. The signature and
ciphertext are then added to the current epoch information. It is
easy to see that the complexity of adding new users is constant
in the number of active group members. By contrast, removing
members requires an update of the whole epoch information, i.e.
the group manager generates a fresh SPS-EQ public key and issues
fresh certificates for each active member. From a practical point of
view this trade-off is acceptable. In particular, we note that adding
a new member is a process that requires the interaction between
the group manager and the user, at least for the group manager to
obtain the new member’s public key. On the other hand, to revoke
a member no interaction is required and the group manager can
perform the operation offline. What is more, this process can be
easily parallelized (each entry can be computed independently) and
changes can be batched (removing more users can be done at once).
It is worth noting that linear complexity in the number of active
members is not inherent for membership revocation, since one
could use cryptographic accumulators [27] to store information
about active members. In such a case the complexity of updates
for the group manager would be linear only in the number of
changes (additions/removes) and not in the number of active users.
Unfortunately, we are not aware of any construction that could uti-
lize this idea without violating the membership privacy properties.
Note that cryptographic accumulators require auxiliary informa-
tion about the added/removed user to be published in order for
the other members to be able to generate membership proofs for
the new accumulator. This information could easily be used by an
adversary to break membership privacy.
The form of the epoch information influences the complexity of
the signing procedure. In our construction, the signer has to find
the entry that corresponds to its identity in the current epoch. To
simplify presentation we made this process linear in the number of
active members. However, it is easy to see that this process need
only be performed once per epoch, i.e. once a member updates their
certificate it can be used to create all subsequent signatures by this
member in the same epoch. In the current construction the epoch
information is represented as a set but it can easily be represented
as an ordered list. To facilitate this, the group manager can create
unique identifiers that can be used to sort the list and members can
find the correct entry using binary search. To preserve membership
privacy, during registration members generate an additional public
key for a key agreement scheme and store the private key securely.
Each epoch the group manager also generates a fresh public key
for the key agreement scheme and uses the shared key as a secret
to generate the unique and hidden identifier, e.g. using a pseudo-
random function. This identifier can easily be reconstructed by
the corresponding member but is indistinguishable from a random
value for all other members and third parties.
Hiding the Group Size. In this paper we do not consider the prob-
lem of hiding the group size but we show how it can be partially
solved using dummy members and a trade-off in the group update
complexity. Our current construction does not hide the size of the
group, since the epoch information size is linear in the number
of active group members. The simplest idea is to create the first
epoch information with dummy users and update it with every addi-
tion/removing. It is easy to see that the size of the epoch information
will be constant (during setup a maximal number of members has
to be chosen) if we replace dummy members by real ones and vice
versa. Unfortunately, this approach requires the whole epoch infor-
mation to be updated for both addition and revocation of members
and not only during the revocation of a member. It also leaks an
upper bound on the group size and requires an update complexity
that is at least linear in the number of active members. However,
we argue that from a practical point of view using dummy users
can be acceptable to protect the size of the group.
A different approach would be to again use cryptographic ac-
cumulators, since they can be constant size and independent of
the number of accumulated values. Unfortunately, this solution is
not better than the above one. To prove membership of a value
in a new accumulator the witness corresponding to the previous
state must be updated. Existing definitions and constructions of
accumulators [27] require that the added/removed value must be
used for this update. Thus, the epoch information must contain
this value is some form (e.g. encrypted). However, in the end since
this value must be part of the epoch information, an adversary can
easily backtrack all previous published information and calculate
the size of the group.
6 EFFICIENT SIGNATURES WITH FLEXIBLE
PUBLIC KEY
Here we propose our signatures with flexible public key. We pro-
pose a scheme that is closely related to the ones proposed in [5].
However, security relies on the bilinear decisional Diffie-Hellman
assumption instead of the decisional linear assumption. This allows
us to decrease the size of the public key by 1 group element in G1,
i.e. from 3 to 2. Unlike the schemes in [5], this scheme only has
class-hiding with key corruption but as already shown this is still
sufficient for group signature constructions.
We assume that both the SFPK.KGen and SFPK.TKGen output
a public key that is the canonical representative of its equivalence
class. Further we assume that every user has access to a collision
resistant hash function H, which we express by including it in
the output of SFPK.CRSGen. The SFPK.ChgPK and SFPK.ChgSK
algorithms work by drawing uniformly at random an exponent r ∈
Zp and raising every component of the public key, or respectively
the secret key to the power of r . More details can be found in
Scheme 5.
Theorem 7 (Unforgeability). Scheme 5 is strongly existential
unforgeable under flexible public key in the crs model, assuming the
bilinear decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption holds and that PHF is a
(1, poly(λ ))-programmable hash function and H is collision-resistant.
Proof. Let (Sig∗SFPK,m∗, pk∗SFPK) be the forgery returned by an
adversaryA, where Sig∗SFPK = (Sig∗1, Sig∗2, Sig∗3, s∗). We distinguish
three types of strategies of the adversary:
Type 1 We call the adversary a type 1 adversary if there exists a
public key pkSFPK and signature SigSFPK = (Sig1, Sig2, Sig3, s)
on messagem generated by oracle O1 or O2, where
H(m∗ | |Sig∗2 | |Sig∗3 | |pk∗SFPK) = H(m | |Sig2 | |Sig3 | |pkSFPK)
It is easy to see that the adversary broke the collision-resistance
of function H and we can build a reduction R that uses A1
to break collision-resistance of function H by simulating the
system and returning
(m∗ | |Sig∗2 | |Sig∗3 | |pk∗SFPK,m | |Sig2 | |Sig3 | |pkSFPK)
as a valid collision.
Type 2 We call the adversary a type 2 adversary if there exists a
public key pkSFPK and signature SigSFPK = (Sig1, Sig2, Sig3, s)
on message m generated by oracle O1 or O2, where e∗ =
H(m∗ | |Sig∗2 | |Sig∗3 | |pk∗SFPK) , H(m | |Sig2 | |Sig3 | |pkSFPK) = e
butM∗ = дe∗1 · дˆs
∗
= дe1 · дˆs = M .
In this case we show that a type 2 can be used to break
the discrete logarithm assumption. We can apply the same
reasoning as for Pedersen commitments, i.e. the reduction
can set дˆ as the element for which we want to compute
the discrete logarithm in respect to д1. The reduction can
then simply simulate the whole system for A2 and output
(e − e∗)/(s∗ − s).
Type 3 We call the adversary a type 3 adversary in all other
cases. In particular, we ensure that M∗ is distinct from all
M’s used in the oracles O1 and O2.
Let (BG,дa1 ,дa2 ,дb1 ,дb2 ,дc1 ,дc2 ,дd1 ,дd2 ) be an instance of the
bilinear decisional Diffie-Hellman problem. We will show
that we can use any efficient adversary A3 can be used to
break the above problem instance. To do so, we will build a
reduction algorithm R that uses A3 in a black box manner,
i.e. it plays the role of the challenger in the unforgeability
experiment.
First R prepares the common reference string ρ by setting
Y1 = дa1 , Y2 = д
a
2 , дˆ = д
z
1 , for some z ←$ Z∗p and ex-
ecutes the trapdoor generation algorithm (KPHF,τPHF) ←$
PHF.TrapGen(1λ ,дa1 ,д1). Note that δρ is not publicly known,
so R does not have to know the exponent a but still knows
z. Next R prepares the public key pkSFPK and the trapdoor
τSFPK. For this it uses the values дb1 and д
b
2 from the problem
instance. It sets pkSFPK = (д1,дb1 ) and τSFPK = (дb2 ).
To answer A’s signing queries for messagem and random-
ness t1 (which is equal to 1 for oracle O1), the reduction R
follows the following steps:
(1) it chooses random values t2 ←$ Z∗p ,
(2) it computesM = дe ′1 · дˆs
′ for some e ′, s ′ ←$ Z∗p ,
(3) it computes (am ,bm ) ←$ PHF.TrapEval(τPHF,M) and aborts
if am = 0,
(4) it computes pk′SFPK ←$ SFPK.ChgPK(pkSFPK, t1),
(5) it computes:
Sig1SFPK = (дa1 )t2 · ((дb1 )(−a
−1
m ·t1) · дt21 ))bm ,
Sig2SFPK = (дb1 )−a
−1
m ·t1 · дt21 ,
Sig3SFPK = (дb2 )−a
−1
m ·t1 · дt22
e = H(m | |Sig2SFPK, Sig3SFPK, pk′SFPK),
s = ((e ′ − e) + s ′ · z)/z,
(6) set the signature
SigSFPK := (Sig1SFPK, Sig2SFPK, Sig3SFPK, s).
It is easy to see that this is a valid signature. Note that the a
valid signature is of the form (дa ·b ·t11 ·((дa1 )am ·дbm1 )r ,дr1 ,дr2 , s).
In this case, the reduction has set r = −a−1m ·b ·t1+t2 and this
means that the дa ·b ·t11 cancels out and the reduction does
not need to compute дa ·b1 . Note that this only works because
am , 0. Otherwise, this would not work.
It follows that for the forgery (pk∗SFPK,m∗, Sig∗SFPK, s∗) ofA
we require that (am∗ ,bm∗ ) ←$ PHF.TrapEval(τPHF,M∗) and
aM∗ = 0, where
M∗ = дe∗1 дˆ
s∗ and e∗ = H(m∗ | |Sig2SFPK | |Sig3SFPK | |pk∗SFPK).
In such a case, the reduction works as follows:
(1) parse Sig∗SFPK as (Sig1SFPK, Sig2SFPK, Sig3SFPK, s∗),
(2) compute
дa ·b ·t ∗1 = Sig
1
SFPK · (Sig2SFPK)−bm∗
=
(
дa ·b ·t ∗1 · ((дa1 )am∗ · дbm∗1 )r
∗ ) · (дr ∗1 )−bm∗ ,
SFPK.CRSGen(1λ)
BG←$ BGGen(λ); y, z ←$ Z∗p
KPHF ←$ PHF.Gen(1λ )
Y1 ← дy1 ; Y2 ← д
y
2 ; дˆ ← дz1
return (ρ := (BG, Y1, Y2, KPHF, дˆ, H),
δρ := (y, z))
SFPK.ChkRep(δSFPK, pkSFPK)
pkSFPK = (pk1, pk2); τSFPK = (τ )
if e(pk1, τ ) = e(pk2, д2)
return 1 else 0
SFPK.KGen(1λ)
x ←$ Z∗p
return (pkSFPK := (д1, дx1 ),
skSFPK := (Y x1 , pkSFPK))
SFPK.TKGen(1λ)
x ←$ Z∗p
return (pkSFPK := (д1, дx1 ),
skSFPK := (Y x1 , pkSFPK),
τSFPK := (дx2 ))
SFPK.Sign(skSFPK,m)
skSFPK = (Z , pkSFPK);
r, s ←$ Z∗p ; Sig2SFPK ← дr1 ; Sig3SFPK ← дr2
h ← H(m | |Sig2SFPK | |Sig3SFPK | |pkSFPK)
M ← дh1 · дˆs
return (Z · (PHF.Eval(KPHF, M ))r , дr1 , дr2 , s)
SFPK.Verify(pkSFPK,m, SigSFPK)
pkSFPK = (·, X ); SigSFPK = (Sig1SFPK, Sig2SFPK, Sig3SFPK, s)
h ← H(m | |Sig2SFPK | |Sig3SFPK | |pkSFPK);M ← дh1 · дˆs
if e(Sig2SFPK, д2) = e(д1, Sig3SFPK) and
e(Sig1SFPK, д2) = e(X , Y2) · e(PHF.Eval(KPHF, M ), Sig3SFPK)
return 1 else 0
Figure 5: Our Flexible Signatures.
(3) parse pk∗SFPK, and since for a valid forgerywe have pk
∗
SFPK ∈
[pkSFPK]R , we have pk∗SFPK = (дt
∗
1 , (дb1 )t
∗ ) and R can use
дt
∗
1 ,
(4) output 1 iff e(дa ·b ·t ∗1 ,дc2 ) = e(дt
∗
1 ,д
d
2 ).
The probability that R successfully solves the bilinear deci-
sional Diffie-Hellman problem depends on the advantage of
A and the probability thatR’s simulation succeeds. Since the
programmable hash functionPHF is (1, poly(λ ))-programmable
and because this is a type 3 adversary, we conclude that this
probability is non-negligible. Note that since in this case we
useA3,M∗ is distinct from allM ’s used in O1 and O2, which
is not the case for type 1 and type 2 adversaries.
□
Theorem 8 (Class-Hiding with Key Corruption). Scheme 5
is class-hiding with key corruption in the crs model, assuming the
decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption holds.
Proof. We start with GAME0 which is the original class-hiding
experiment and let S0 be an event that the experiment evaluates to
1, i.e. the adversary wins. We will use Si to denote the event that
the adversary wins the class-hiding experiment in GAMEi .
Let pkSFPK = (A,B) be the public key given to the adversary,
pk0 = (A0,B0) = (д1,дx01 ) and pk1 = (A0,B1) = (д1,дx11 ) be the
public keys that are returned by SFPK.KGen, sk0 = (Y x01 , pk0) and
sk1 = (Y x11 , pk1) the corresponding secret keys and bˆ be the bit
chosen by the challenger.
GAME1: In this game we do not use the SFPK.ChgSK algorithm
to compute skSFPK and pkSFPK but compute them as pkSFPK =
(Q,Qxbˆ ), and skSFPK = ((Qxbˆ )y , pkSFPK), where Y1 = дy1 is part of
the common reference string ρ generated by the challenger. In other
words, instead of using the exponent r to randomize the public key
and secret key, we use a group element Q to do it.
Since the distribution of the keys does not change, it follows
that Pr[S1] = Pr[S0]. Note that the oracle can still use skSFPK to
compute valid signatures.
GAME1: In this game instead of computing pkSFPK = (Q,Qxbˆ ) as
in GAME1, we sample B′ ←$ G1 and set pkSFPK = (Q,B′).
We will show that this transition only lowers the adversaries ad-
vantage by a negligible fraction. This can be shown by construction
using a reduction R that uses an adversary A that can distinguish
between those two games to break the decisional Diffie-Hellman
assumption in G1.
Let (дα1 ,д
β
1 ,д
γ
1 ) be an instance of this problem in G1. R sam-
ples r0, r1 ←$ Z∗p and sets B0 = (дα1 )r0 , B1 = (дα1 )r1 . Note that
in such a case, we also have to set sk0 = ((B0)y , pk0) and sk1 =
((B1)y , pk1). Additionally, the reduction uses Q = дβ1 and the pub-
lic key pkSFPK = (Q, (дγ1 )rbˆ ). Note that the reduction can use the
secret key skSFPK = (((дγ1 )rbˆ )y , pkSFPK) to generate signatures and
answer signing queries. Now γ = α · β then pkSFPK has the same
distribution as in GAME1 and otherwise as in GAME2. Thus, it
follows that |Pr[S2] − Pr[S1]| ≤ AdvddhA (λ).
We will now show that we have Pr[S2] = 12 . This follow from
the fact that we have pkSFPK = (Q,B′) and signatures of the form
SigSFPK = ((B′)y · (PHF.Eval(KPHF,m))r ,дr1 ,дr2 , s) for some r ∈ Z∗p
and Q,B′, which are independent from the bit bˆ. Thus, we have
Advc-hA,SFPK(λ) = Pr[S0] ≤ AdvddhA (λ). □
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